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CRITICAL RACE SCIENCE 
AND CRITICAL RACE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 
Paul Gowder*
INTRODUCTION 
 
Over several decades, feminist philosophy of science has revealed the 
ways in which much of science has proceeded from “mainstream” 
assumptions that privilege men and other hierarchically superordinate 
groups and existing socially constructed conceptions of gender.  In doing 
so, it has produced a research program that, while rooted in the post-
Kuhnian philosophy and sociology of science that has been taken up by 
many students of scientific method more generally, has been used to 
critique great swathes of modern science and to reveal both the biases of the 
mainstream, and the transformative potential of a science that proceeds 
from the epistemic standpoints of women as well as men and from the 
research questions and concerns that arise from the goal of promoting 
equality between men and women. 
By contrast, there is not yet a consolidated research program that could 
fall under the name “critical race philosophy of science” (or, perhaps more 
accurately and certainly more inclusively, “critical race science studies”).1
 
*  Associate Professor of Law, Adjunct Associate Professor of Political Science (by 
courtesy), University of Iowa; Member (2014–15), Institute for Advanced Study.  I thank the 
participants in the Critical Race Theory and Empirical Methods Conference held at Fordham 
University School of Law for extremely helpful comments, and my excellent research 
assistants, Diego Ramirez and Eric Schmitt, for (as the title and the adjective suggest) 
excellently assisting this research.  For an overview of the symposium, see Kimani Paul-
Emile, Foreword:  Critical Race Theory and Empirical Methods Conference, 83 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 2953 (2015). 
  
 
 1. Indeed, some of the work that could lay claim to the mantle of critical race 
philosophy of science has been generated from outside the critical race theory research 
program.  For example, Sandra Harding, arguably the founder of feminist philosophy of 
science, has explained how the insights she has generated also apply to the category of race. 
See generally Sandra Harding, Science, Race, Culture, Empire, in A COMPANION TO RACIAL 
AND ETHNIC STUDIES 217 (David Theo Goldberg & John Solomos eds., 2002); THE “RACIAL” 
ECONOMY OF SCIENCE:  TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC FUTURE (Sandra Harding ed., 1993).  The 
history of science suggests that this is a natural development, and one to be welcomed:  
women and people of color have been treated similarly in fundamental ways by the 
“mainstream” scientific enterprise. See generally Nancy Leys Stepan, Race and Gender:  
The Role of Analogy in Science, 77 ISIS 261 (1986) (explaining how similar metaphorical 
reasoning has underlain the scientific treatment of both categories).  Nonetheless, the 
insights of feminist standpoint theory (to be discussed below) suggest that a unified meta-
scientific research program by people of color, driven by the aims of critical race theory, has 
distinctive contributions to make on its own terms. 
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There is extraordinary work from a critical race perspective in discrete areas 
of research, such as in the critique of the use of racial categories in genetic 
research and medical research more generally,2 on race in sociology and 
allied fields, such as education and demography (and with the latter, census-
taking),3 and on the history of scientific racism.4  There are also 
philosophers of science, some of whom might be described as “critical,” 
who argue about whether race exists.5
 
 2. See generally DOROTHY ROBERTS, FATAL INVENTION:  HOW SCIENCE, POLITICS, AND 
BIG BUSINESS RE-CREATE RACE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2011) (criticizing 
contemporary science for its pernicious reliance on social construct of race); Lundy Braun & 
Evelynn Hammonds, The Dilemma of Classification:  The Past in the Present, in GENETICS 
AND THE UNSETTLED PAST:  THE COLLISION OF DNA, RACE AND HISTORY (Keith Wailoo, 
Alondra Nelson & Catherine Lee eds., 2012) (tracing history and lingering effects of 
colonial racial classifications in contemporary research); Lundy Braun et al., Racial 
Categories in Medical Practice:  How Useful Are They?, 4 PLOS MED. 1423 (2007) 
(critiquing simplistic use of racial categories in medical treatment); Jenny Reardon, The 
Democratic, Anti-Racist Genome?  Technoscience at the Limits of Liberalism, 21 SCI. AS 
CULTURE 25 (2012) (critiquing genetic science even for purportedly progressive approaches, 
such as allowing subjects to self-define racial categories, for ignoring the social context in 
which such self-definition was embedded); Alexandra E. Shields et al., The Use of Race 
Variables in Genetic Studies of Complex Traits and the Goal of Reducing Health 
Disparities:  A Transdisciplinary Perspective, 60 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 77 (2005) (critiquing 
the ways in which race is used in biological sciences and offering recommendations for 
methodological and policy improvement). 
  But those areas of research have not 
been unified into a single school of scholarship that asserts itself in the form 
of general ideas about race and empirical research, one that can inform 
 3. See, e.g., Tukufu Zuberi & Eduardo Bonilla-Silva, WHITE LOGIC, WHITE METHODS:  
RACISM AND METHODOLOGY (2008) (collection of essays exploring connection between 
racial hierarchy and sociological methods); see also, e.g., Dolores Delgado Bernal, Critical 
Race Theory, Latino Critical Theory, and Critical Raced-Gendered Epistemologies:  
Recognizing Students of Color As Holders and Creators of Knowledge, 8 QUALITATIVE 
INQUIRY 105 (2002) (describing a critical race epistemology in educational research which 
recognizes social location–rooted knowledge in students); see also CLARA E. RODRIGUEZ, 
CHANGING RACE:  LATINOS, THE CENSUS, AND THE HISTORY OF ETHNICITY (2000); 
Symposium, Critical Race Theory and Education, 8 QUALITATIVE INQUIRY 3 (2002); 
Gurminder K. Bhambra, A Sociological Dilemma:  Race, Segregation and US Sociology, 62 
CURRENT SOC. MONOGRAPH 472 (2014) (criticizing white sociological tradition for ignoring 
parallel black sociological tradition and the intellectual distortion that ignorance has caused).  
For discussion about the census, see Matthew Snipp, Racial Measurement in the American 
Census: Past Practices and Implications for the Future, 29 ANN. REV. SOC. 563 (2003) 
(discussing consequences for social science of changing census categories). 
 4. See, e.g., ELAZAR BARKAN, THE RETREAT OF SCIENTIFIC RACISM:  CHANGING 
CONCEPTS OF RACE IN BRITAIN AND UNITED STATES BETWEEN THE WORLD WARS (1993); 
WILLIAM H. TUCKER, THE SCIENCE AND POLITICS OF RACIAL RESEARCH (1994).  This 
category has some overlap with the critique of medical and genetic research, especially as a 
response to studies purporting to describe a relationship between genetic race and 
intelligence. See generally Audrey Smedley & Brian D. Smedley, Race As Biology Is 
Fiction, Racism As a Social Problem Is Real:  Anthropological and Historical Perspectives 
on the Social Construction of Race, 60 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 16 (2005) (critiquing concept of 
race as used in genetic arguments about black intellectual ability). 
 5. See, e.g., Kwame Anthony Appiah, The Uncompleted Argument: Du Bois and the 
Illusion of Race, 12 CRITICAL INQUIRY 21 (1985); Lisa Gannett, The Biological Reification of 
Race, 55 BRIT. J. PHIL. SCI. 323 (2004); Adam Hochman, Against the New Racial 
Naturalism, 6 J. PHIL. 331 (2013). 
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empirical research internal to the critical race research program (“critical 
race science”) and enlighten and critique research external to that program.6
We need one.  To show why, I argue that the act of observation itself 
becomes a fraught enterprise when it interacts with race, and that 
empirically informed critical race theory and critical race theory informed 
philosophy of science can mitigate that problem.  When we (even, I shall 
suggest, the “we” that includes social scientists, critical race theorists, and 
critical race social scientists) observe the race of others, that observation is 
not a neutral act.  We cannot just observe the “fact” of someone’s race as if 
it is out there in the world—and by saying that, I do not just mean the 
(fairly well-accepted) point that race is a social rather than a natural kind,
 
7 
but also that even the social facts of race are observationally unstable.  
Moreover, race is a complex, rather than a simple, social kind, in that it is 
best empirically conceptualized as a cluster of observations, which are not 
always perfectly correlated, rather than an individual observation.8
While I do not mean by this Essay to deny the possibility of objective 
knowledge (or, heaven forbid, truth) tout court, as some postmodernists 
have been known to do, I do deny that there can be any objective 
knowledge about any individual’s race (or the races of a collection of 
individuals), because people do not have races except as a product of 
cognitions that change depending on the cognition-haver’s distinct position 
in a social world.  I further assert that, in our (2015 American) culture, it is 
difficult and sometimes impossible to acquire objective knowledge about 
facts linked to race within our patterns of biases and stereotypes—not 
because those facts do not exist, but because the mental operation of 
observing them is irredeemably tainted by the hierarchical racial categories 
present in our social world. 
 
When we see someone’s “race,” at best we are observing a pattern of 
linguistic behavior from the observed and others who interact with the 
observed (what A says B’s race is, what B says B’s race is, et cetera), 
including the behavior of the observer him or herself.  An observer may 
 
 6. Cf. HELEN LONGINO, SCIENCE AS SOCIAL KNOWLEDGE:  VALUES AND OBJECTIVITY IN 
SCIENTIFIC INQUIRY 214 (1990) (“[O]ne could practice science as a feminist by 
(1) recognizing the ways in which the background assumptions of mainstream science 
facilitated certain conclusions and excluded others and (2) deliberately using background 
assumptions appropriately at variance with those of mainstream science.”). 
 7. See generally SALLY HASLANGER, RESISTING REALITY:  SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION AND 
SOCIAL CRITIQUE 365–80 (2012) (explaining the notion of race as a social kind).  In this 
Essay, I assume that those who deny that race exists apart from as a social phenomenon are 
correct.  However, some philosophers assert that there can be a (non-racist) biological notion 
of race. See, e.g., Quayshawn Spencer, A Radical Solution to the Race Problem, 81 PHIL. 
SCI. 1025 (2014).  Space does not permit me to argue with those philosophers here; however, 
I do note that even if one accepts their views, it does not follow that what they see as 
biologically real racial categories are amenable to observation on an individual-by-individual 
basis. 
 8. See Maya Sen & Omar Wasow, Race As a ‘Bundle of Sticks’: Designs That Estimate 
Effects of Seemingly Immutable Characteristics, 19 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. (forthcoming 2016) 
(reviewing an extensive body of literature suggesting race is an unstable evaluation of an 
underlying cluster of observations, such as names, physical and social locations, physical 
features, and the like). 
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also observe physical and social characteristics that are associated with race 
on our dominant popular cultural (“folk”) theory of race, but the second set 
of observations depends in part on the first.  Racial observations are 
embedded in a complex network of multidirectional causation between 
observer, observed, observational categories, and other social facts; that 
embededness is inconsistent with objective observation of race or those 
other facts. 
In short, to observe race is to ascribe it, an irreducibly social act.  But 
empiricists of all types—including critical race theory empiricists; other 
kinds of social scientists, such as census-takers; appliers of affirmative 
action policies; and other policy-making and implementing officials—find 
themselves observing race, either directly, in experimental research and 
original data generation, or indirectly, in relying on the observations of 
others as encapsulated in survey data and the like.  Many times, these 
observations are not methodologically sophisticated and risk reifying 
hierarchical race categories, even as they purport to study them. 
We need a critical race philosophy of science because this is true of all 
kinds of observations, and we can understand the problems facing race best 
if we understand it as a distinctive species of a general problem.  Helen 
Longino put it best:  “Observation is not simple sense perception (whatever 
that might be) but an organized sensory encounter that registers what is 
perceived in relation to categories, concepts, and classes that are socially 
produced.”9
*     *     * 
  This fact about observation becomes a danger when it collides 
with the fact that some of those “categories, concepts, and classes” are 
hierarchically organized, like gender and like race, for it suggests that the 
social hierarchies can distort the results of the science and can become self-
reinforcing through the scientific process. 
Before moving on, we must specify a vocabulary even to express the 
references to “race” in this Essay.  The folk theory of race suggests that 
one’s race (derived from something like facts about one’s skin color and 
one’s ancestry in some mysterious combination) is more or less invariant 
across time and space; accordingly, our ordinary language only permits me 
to speak of, say, someone who is “black” or “white” regardless of who is 
observing the someone and under what social context.  But because the folk 
theory is false, ordinary language will have to give way.  Moreover, even 
sophisticated social scientists who make use of observer-contingent racial 
categories (i.e., self-identified race and the race identified of a subject by a 
survey-taker) fail to take account of the time-contingent, complex, and 
interactive nature of those ascriptions, which can change due to events in 
the life of observer or observed, including events attached to the act of 
observation itself (some of which will be discussed below).  As this Essay 
describes a number of studies with race as a variable, it ought to be a model 
for relative precision in racial description. 
 
 9. HELEN E. LONGINO, THE FATE OF KNOWLEDGE 100 (2002). 
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I shall describe racial terms, then, with respect to both observers and 
times.  For example, I shall say that a “self-ascribed” race is one which the 
person whose race is relevant applies to him or herself, and an “observer-
ascribed race” is the race that a (specified) external observer applies to the 
observed.10
Our vocabulary has to be able to express not only inconsistency but 
consistency.  There are some people who have strong racial ascriptions (in 
our cultural context) that do not tend to change based on observer or time.  
We will all pretty much agree, for example, that Dr. Dre and Oprah Winfrey 
are black and that Mitt Romney and Eminem are white, and it is hard to 
imagine those ascriptions changing any time soon.  I shall describe such 
situations as cases of “generally ascribed” race.  Of course, it is possible for 
people to disagree about general ascriptions, to deny, for example, that we 
all understand Eminem as white (he has, after all, made a career out of what 
many understand as a distinctively black form of cultural production).  It 
will thus sometimes be necessary to identify the source of a supposed 
general ascription as well. 
  When I speak of such racial ascriptions, I shall mean only 
those ascriptions that are made at a single time and in a single social 
context, because we also know that racial ascriptions are conditional on 
short-term changes in social facts about the individual as well as long-term 
changes in the social meaning of race in and across cultures.  Ordinarily, 
that time and context will be the time and context of a given research study, 
for example, when the social scientist carrying out an observation records a 
race assigned to a research subject.  However, sometimes there will be 
multiple times at issue; in such situations, I shall specify the time as well.  
In reporting the results of studies which (sloppily) ascribe a race to subjects, 
but do not report who has issued that ascription, I will say that the subjects 
have an “unknown-ascribed” race. 
These observer- and time-relative appendages to racial observations 
should extend to the ascription of race-linked secondary qualities, 
particularly those related to racial stereotypes.  For example, blacks are 
stereotyped as hostile and violent,11
 
 10. Sen and Wasow aptly point out that researchers are generally unable either to 
observe or to experimentally manipulate the race that subjects ascribe to those whom they 
observe. Sen & Wasow, supra note 
 and this stereotype is consistent with 
the empirical phenomenon by which observers tend to perceive unknown 
8, at 20–21.  Instead, what they observe in experimental 
contexts are signals of race (as in, for example, experiments that manipulate the assignment 
of racially stereotypical names).  I speak of racial ascriptions rather than signal observations 
here to capture the idea that race researchers typically are trying to use measurements of 
signal observations as a proxy for racial ascriptions, and with the implicit or explicit 
supposition that subjects who are exposed to a racial signal will be more likely to ascribe the 
race in question to the one about whom the signal is sent.  Incidentally, whether some piece 
of sense-data is a component or a signal of race may itself be observer-dependent:  a black-
sounding name, for example, may be taken by one observer (consciously or unconsciously) 
to count as evidence of the race of the one whose name it is, and by another to count as part 
of what it means to be black. 
 11. Patricia G. Devine & Andrew J. Elliot, Are Racial Stereotypes Really Fading?  The 
Princeton Trilogy Revisited, 21 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1139, 1146–48 
(1995). 
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objects in the hands of blacks as weapons and of others as not weapons.12
That being said, we may now move onto the material proper. 
  
Those who are more subject to such stereotypes are more likely to make 
those ascriptions.  Accordingly, it will be necessary to specify, for example, 
who decides that a given subject is hostile or holding a weapon in a 
scientific study and when that decision is made. 
I.   THEORIES, STANDPOINTS, AND OTHER OBSERVATION-DISTORTERS 
Since the latter half of the twentieth century, many philosophers and 
sociologists of science have recognized that observation is theory-laden.13
For example, for a chemist to say that she observes a solution emitting a 
“gas” presupposes some account of the behavior and properties of gases 
that allows her to apply that concept to the data that come in through her 
sensory apparatus.  The problem begins when we consider that the 
experiment our chemist is conducting might bear on the question of whether 
she should accept her account of the properties of gases in the first place.  
What a mess!  This kind of theory-ladenness leads on a fairly direct skid to 
holism:  our chemist’s observation of a gas turns out to be capable of 
denting not a single scientific proposition but a collection of propositions, 
such that, for example, if she expects to see a liquid but sees a gas, she 
knows that she might reject either the theory that says her reaction should 
have produced a liquid or her account of the properties of a liquid.
  
The idea, loosely speaking, is that the concepts we use to describe and 
understand the things we observe can only be accessed using our 
preexisting theories of those observations. 
14
So suppose an observer sees a light-skinned (as she understands it) 
subject, and that subject introduces his biological parents to the observer.  It 
turns out that the observer perceives his mother as very dark-skinned, such 
that the observer ascribes blackness to the mother.  It is obvious that the 
race she ascribes to the subject will depend on her personal theory of race, 
in particular, on the extent to which she subscribes (consciously or 
unconsciously) to the notion of hypodescent (the “one-drop rule”).  If, to 
her, race is more about skin color, then she may ascribe blackness to the 
mother and whiteness to the son.
 
15
 
 12. Christopher R. Jones & Russell H. Fazio, Person Categorization and Automatic 
Racial Stereotyping Effects on Weapon Identification, 36 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 
BULL. 1073, 1073 (2010). 
  By contrast, if race to her is about 
 13. See generally W. V. Quine, In Praise of Observation Sentences, 90 J. PHIL. 107, 
107–10 (1993) (describing the theory-ladenness debate and taking something like an 
intermediate position). 
 14. See W. V. Quine, On Empirically Equivalent Systems of the World, 9 ERKENNTNIS 
313, 313–14 (1975) (describing Duhem-Quine holism). 
 15. “May” and “will” statements, with respect to racial ascriptions, ought to be read as 
probabilistic.  The sentence in the text, for example, should more precisely read “it would be 
reasonable, when considering a person who subscribes to a theory of race according to which 
it is primarily composed of skin color and who interacts with a person whose skin color she 
perceives as dark, to assign a higher subjective probability to that observer’s ascribing 
blackness to the one whom she or he observes than we would otherwise assign, all else being 
equal.” But such writing inflicts far too much pain on the reader. 
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ancestry, and if she accepts the notion that a single identifiably black 
ancestor makes the descendant black, then she will ascribe blackness to the 
son as well.16
Now suppose she also subscribes to a theory according to which race is 
partly a function of behavior, either implicitly—because her mind has been 
captured by implicit stereotypes and ascribes races in part based on 
behavior consistent with those stereotypes—or explicitly—as with those 
trials at least through the early twentieth century which adjudicated the race 
of litigants in part based on their behavior.
 
17
Of course, she might just decide to accommodate the pull offered by both 
her theories of race and categorize the one whom she is observing as 
“multiracial.”  And that works fine, until we turn her into a survey-taker and 
give her a form to fill out which was written by a principal investigator 
whose theories of race or research goals do not accommodate multiraciality.  
Then she is forced to choose, or perhaps to check multiple boxes and 
wonder whether the PI will throw out the respondent’s data as miscoded. 
  And suppose the observed 
acts in a “white” kind of way.  Then our observer has a problem much like 
that of the chemist:  should she allow that observation to undermine her 
belief in the one-drop rule, or should she allow it to undermine her belief in 
the relationship between race and behavior? 
The penultimate twist in that last example hints at a second dimension of 
theory-ladenness in social research:  the interpretation of observed behavior 
(in the example, whether the behavior is white-like or black-like) is also 
theory-laden.  A textbook on survey methodology gives a trivial example:  
the question “do you like football” can be interpreted as referring to liking 
to watch football, liking to play football, or both.18
 
 16. Or, in principle, she could ascribe whiteness to the mother.  However, for some odd 
reason, it is hard (for me) to imagine that happening.  I cannot say whether this difficulty of 
imagination represents a fact of the matter about how we apply racial ascriptions in our 
culture or merely a way in which that culture and/or idiosyncratic effects that apply to me 
only have distorted my own thinking about the matter.  (This difficulty itself should be a 
lesson:  the influence of background ideas about race in the wider culture not only affects our 
empirical research but also the way we think about that research in an abstracted mode of 
analysis.). 
  The divergence 
between the two interpretations—and the possibility of the respondent 
answering a different question from the one that the researcher meant to 
ask—arises from the researcher’s implicit and understated theory of what 
the linguistic behavior “yes, I like football” means.  This is a quintessential 
problem of what survey methodologists call “operationalization,” or how 
the concepts of interest in the researcher’s head translate into questions on 
the page. 
 17. See, e.g., ANGELA ONWUACHI-WILLIG, ACCORDING TO OUR HEARTS:  RHINELANDER V. 
RHINELANDER AND THE LAW OF THE MULTIRACIAL FAMILY 108–16 (2013) (describing a case 
in which the defendant’s behavior was relevant for determining her race); see also ARIELA J. 
GROSS, WHAT BLOOD WON’T TELL:  A HISTORY OF RACE ON TRIAL IN AMERICA 48–72 (2008) 
(giving further cases of race being established in American courts in part by the behavior of 
the person whose race was at issue). 
 18. WILLEM E. SARIS & IRMTRAUD N. GALLHOFER, DESIGN, EVALUATION, AND ANALYSIS 
OF QUESTIONNAIRES FOR SURVEY RESEARCH 6 (2007). 
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Moreover, a key insight from feminist philosophy of science is that the 
theories with which observations are laden are not independent of our social 
positions.19  I summarize the point by example.  Men and women have 
access to different knowledge based on their different roles in the world.  
For example, women know what it is like to be subject to the pervasive 
threat of gender-based violence in a different way than do men, and for that 
reason are likely to be more capable of framing research questions to 
understand the phenomenon.  More generally, existing research in male-
dominated science is likely to reflect a neglect of the interests and 
experiences of women, in view of male researchers’ lack of access to the 
first-person experience of those interests and experiences.  When women in 
general, or feminists in particular (those who are motivated in their 
scientific research by the goal of promoting the equality of women), enter 
the scientific enterprise, that enterprise improves with respect to the 
(presumptively neutral) goals of science itself, because the knowledge held 
by those in the social position of women and the research aims of feminists 
refocus the inquiry on previously neglected questions as well as reveal 
previously unnoticed scientific errors.20
Broader still, social hierarchies themselves interfere, in a researcher-
independent way, in the process of scientific inquiry.  For example, some of 
the socially constructed hierarchical categories with which we operate and 
into which we contextualize knowledge are themselves distorting influences 
on the scientific process, because of the way they shape the research 
questions we ask and the answers we look for.
  The same points obviously apply 
to race, suggesting that the research produced by scientists of color (“as 
ascribed by whom” is an open question) and/or with the aim of advancing 
racial equality may focus on questions and use approaches heretofore 
neglected by white scientists (once again, with the source of the ascription 
left hanging) and those without such an aim. 
21
 
 19. See Alison Wylie, Why Standpoint Matters, in SCIENCE AND OTHER CULTURES:  
ISSUES IN PHILOSOPHIES OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY (Robert Figueroa & Sandra Harding 
eds., 2003). See generally Elizabeth Anderson, Feminist Epistemology and Philosophy of 
Science, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. §§ 1–2, 9, available at http://plato.stanford.edu/ 
archives/fall2012/entries/feminism-epistemology/ (last updated Mar. 16, 2011) (explaining 
the ideas of situated knowledge and standpoint theory).  Note that Wylie distinguishes 
“locations” and “standpoints,” where the former are social positions (being ascribed female 
gender or black race, for example) and the latter is an enterprise of critical inquiry into social 
hierarchy (being a feminist or a critical race theorist). Id.  Both are important. 
 
 20. Wylie, supra note 19, at 33 (“[S]uch a standpoint may fruitfully raise standards of 
empirical adequacy for hitherto unexamined presuppositions, expand the range of 
hypotheses under consideration in ways that ultimately improve explanatory power, and 
open up new lines of inquiry.”). 
 21. See, e.g., Donna J. Haraway, In the Beginning Was the Word:  The Genesis of 
Biological Theory, 6 SIGNS 469, 477–78 (1981) (recounting feminist critique of 
sociobiological account of sex difference, according to which part of the problem was the 
hierarchical gender categories into which the research was constructed in the first place); see 
Helen Longino & Ruth Doell, Body, Bias and Behavior: A Comparative Analysis of 
Reasoning in Two Areas of Biological Science, 9 SIGNS 206, 208–10 (1983) (explaining that 
the selection of facts on which to attend and the conceptual categories into which we 
organize them are influenced by the wider culture). 
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Something like the just world fallacy22 can also operate in science, 
leading to a bias in favor of the study and confirmation of scientific 
explanations that support the existing social order, including its unjust 
hierarchies.23  An empirical scientist in a lab or with a dataset and a 
statistics program cannot simply work aimlessly at crunching numbers and 
generate knowledge at the end of it.24  Rather, scientists start with a 
hypothesis to be tested, and social science as it is currently constructed has 
well-known biases toward publishing only research that confirms 
previously framed hypotheses.25
The impact of theory-ladenness in racial observation is likely to be broad 
and substantial.  There is substantial evidence that facts about social status 
are linked to the very act of making racial ascriptions in the first place.
  But in a social world constructed in part 
by unjust hierarchies and driven by just-world biases, researchers—
especially those from the socially dominant groups which also dominate the 
academy—are likely to be consciously or unconsciously motivated to test 
hypotheses that justify social hierarchies (such as hypotheses that confirm 
stereotypes about subordinated groups); publication bias is more likely to 
generate evidence in favor of those hypotheses, all else being equal, 
because those empirical results which support researchers’ hypotheses will 
be published while disconfirmatory results will not. 
26
Sociologists have shown that the same person can be coded by an 
observer as black or white depending on long-term status cues such as 
whether that person is incarcerated or free, whether she or he is employed 
  
The evidence I am about to describe ought to be understood as an instance 
of theory-ladenness, as it reflects the implicit background theory of what 
race is in the broader culture.  Moreover, it introduces an important form of 
observer-contingency (that is, bias) to empirical research with racial 
variables.  An observer who is more susceptible to the status contingency of 
racial classification will, for example, be more likely to blacken a low-
status subject and whiten a high-status subject than an observer who is less 
susceptible. 
 
 22. See generally MELVIN LERNER, THE BELIEF IN A JUST WORLD:  A FUNDAMENTAL 
DELUSION (1980). 
 23. See Longino & Doell, supra note 21, at 207–08 (1983) (explaining how scientific 
theories have been driven in part by male motive “to justify their social dominance by 
appealing to ostensibly natural differences between males and females”). 
 24. Such “data-mining”—essentially running a bunch of regressions at random and 
taking those that produce results as knowledge—falls prey to problems inherent in the 
enterprise of significance testing.  A conventional significance level of .05 suggests that fully 
five percent of the correlations such a method turns up will be nothing more than random 
noise.  As for most of the rest, such correlations will be without any recognizable 
significance for causal analysis (does X cause Y, Y cause X, or something else cause both?), 
and mostly useless. See Aris Spanos, Revisiting Data Mining:  “Hunting” With or Without a 
License, 7 J. ECON. METHODOLOGY 231, 244–46 (2000) (discussing these issues). 
 25. See generally Kay Dickersin, The Existence of Publication Bias and Risk Factors for 
Its Occurrence, 263 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1385 (1990) (explaining publication bias). 
 26. For a more detailed presentation of this evidence, see Paul Gowder, Racial 
Classification and Ascriptive Injury, WASH. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015). 
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or unemployed, and whether she or he is on public assistance or not.27  
Within these broad categories, racial observation also conditions on more 
narrow status differences, such as the status of the observed’s 
employment.28  Even more broadly, experimental subjects seem to have 
difficulty making or maintaining racial ascriptions that conflict with status 
information.  For example, it is more difficult for (unknown-ascribed) 
whites to remember that people who are (according to the researchers, 
generally ascribed) black in fact have that classification when they are 
admired and famous.29
Not only do observed racial identities vary on chronic status cues, such as 
employment status, they also vary on acute stimuli like the invocation of 
status-linked racial stereotypes.
 
30  When experimental subjects are primed 
with words like “violent” and “loud,” they more readily identify faces as 
black; when primed with words like “honest” and “smart” they more readily 
identify faces as white, and the “response conflict” which generated slower 
identifications with incongruent stereotype priming was measurable at the 
neurological level.31  Subjects exposed to hostile or angry faces are more 
likely to later remember those faces as black, in accordance with violent 
stereotypes assigned to that racial classification.32
It is easy to see how these biases could distort practical research in social 
science.  Consider, for example, a hypothetical “aggression experiment,” in 
which an observer is asked to decide whether the behavior of an 
experimental subject is hostile or violent:  such a decision is likely to be 
distorted by implicit racial stereotypes associating blacks with violence.  
 
 
 27. See Aliya Saperstein & Andrew M. Penner, Racial Fluidity and Inequality in the 
United States, 118 AM. J. SOC. 676 (2012). 
 28. See Jonathan B. Freeman et al., Looking the Part:  Social Status Cues Shape Race 
Perception, 6 PLOS ONE 1, 2 (2011) (varying clothing between janitorial and corporate 
wear associated with change in other-reported racial ascription); Aliya Saperstein & Aaron 
Gullickson, A Mulatto Escape Hatch in the United States?  Examining Evidence of U.S. 
Racial and Social Mobility in the Jim Crow Era, 50 DEMOGRAPHY 1921, 1935 (2013) 
(finding that improvements in occupational status were associated with higher probability of 
being classified as mulatto rather than black in repeat census-taking during the late 
nineteenth century); Aliya Saperstein et al., The Criminal Justice System and the 
Racialization of Perceptions, 651 ANNALS AM. ACAD. OF POL. & SOC. SCI. 104, 112–16 
(2014) (single arrest between two waves of a survey associated with increasing probability 
of being ascribed blackness by survey interviewers, lower probability of being ascribed 
Asianness; multiple arrests associated with lower probability of being ascribed whiteness). 
 29. Jennifer A. Richeson & Sophie Trawalter, On the Categorization of Admired and 
Disliked Exemplars of Admired and Disliked Racial Groups, 89 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 517, 520 (2005). 
 30. Bruce D. Bartholow & Cheryl L. Dickter, A Response Conflict Account of the Effects 
of Stereotypes on Racial Categorization, 26 SOC. COGNITION 314, 325–29 (2008). 
 31. Id. 
 32. Joshua M. Ackerman et al., They All Look the Same to Me (Unless They’re Angry):  
From Out-Group Homogeneity to Out-Group Heterogeneity, 17 PSYCHOL. SCI. 836 (2006); 
Kurt Hugenberg & Galen V. Bodenhausen, Ambiguity in Social Categorization:  The Rule of 
Prejudice and Facial Affect in Race Categorization, 15 PSYCHOL. SCI. 342, 344–45 (2004); 
Paul B. Hutchings & Geoffrey Haddock, Look Black in Anger:  The Role of Implicit 
Prejudice in the Categorization and Perceived Emotional Intensity of Racially Ambiguous 
Faces, 44 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 1418, 1418 (2008). 
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Such an observer, for example, may be more likely to ascribe blackness to 
those whom he sees as aggressive. 
Even directly attending to physical characteristics associated with race 
can be disrupted by status information.  Evidence suggests that stereotypes 
are perceived in clusters:  if Alter is observed in association with 
stereotypical criminal behaviors, or stereotypical lack of education, Ego 
may perceive or remember her as having more “black” physical features 
than she otherwise would.33
That last example highlights another effect of theory-ladenness in the 
context of racial observation:  observations about properties that are socially 
associated with race—like physical features—can also be affected by a 
racial ascription.  Return to our hypodescent example.  An observer who 
subscribes to the theory of hypodescent will apply the ascription “black” to 
lighter-skinned people than will an observer who does not subscribe to 
hypodescent.  Even if she consciously tries to ascribe racial categories 
purely on skin hue for experimental purposes (e.g., pursuant to the training 
given to a group of survey-takers by a researcher who is purely concerned 
with the effect of skin color), the fact that she subscribes (consciously or 
unconsciously) to the theory of hypodescent might color (as it were) her 
subsequent hue attribution.  Given the evidence that skin color perceptions 
depend on social status information and other racially associated traits, it is 
reasonable to worry that, having ascribed black race to a given subject for 
the purposes of her own intuitions, she may perceive that subject’s skin as 
darker for the purposes of survey reporting.
 
34
One might ask whether this makes a difference.  To what extent are 
enough people’s races generally ascribed that all these sources of variation 
are likely to amount to a small degree of random error?  Arguably, the same 
general social forces are operating on all observers—if both the phenotypic 
and status information available to all observers about a given person are 
the same, and all observers live in a society with a more or less common 
folk theory of race, then we might expect those observers to come up with 
fairly consistent racial ascriptions about the person.  However, there is 
evidence for a substantial amount of inconsistency, at least between self-
ascribed race and other-ascribed race.
 
35
 
 33. Danny Osborne & Paul G. Davies, Eyewitness Identifications Are Affected by 
Stereotypes About a Suspect’s Level of Perceived Stereotypicality, 16 GROUP PROCESSES & 
INTERGROUP RELS. 1, 2 (2012) (crimes); Avi Ben-Zeev et al., When an “Educated” Black 
Man Becomes Lighter in the Mind’s Eye:  Evidence for a Skin Tone Memory Bias, SAGE 
OPEN, Jan.–Mar. 2014, at 1, 3–5, 7, available at http://sgo.sagepub.com/content/ 
4/1/2158244013516770.full-text.pdf+html. 
  There is some reason to believe 
 34. Cf. Ben-Zeev et al., supra note 33 (social contingency of observed skin coloration); 
Osborne & Davies, supra note 33 (same); see also Otto H. MacLin & Roy S. Malpass, The 
Ambiguous Race Face Illusion, 32 PERCEPTION 249, 250 (2003) (reporting subjects seeing 
darker skin when exposed to otherwise identical subjects with stereotypically black 
hairstyles). 
 35. See Melissa R. Herman, Do You See What I Am?  How Observers’ Backgrounds 
Affect Their Perceptions of Multiracial Faces, 73 SOC. PSYCHOL. Q. 58, 66 (2010) (noting 
that 45 percent of over 5000 photo views in an experiment showed incongruence between 
race as ascribed by the viewer and race as ascribed by the one photographed; only 29 percent 
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that such inconsistency has serious social consequences.  For example, Roth 
argues that there is strong reason to worry about under-identification of 
discrimination against Latinos, because (1) many people who are ascribed a 
Latino identity by others on the basis of phenotypic characteristics ascribe 
white identity to themselves, and (2) there is evidence of discrimination on 
the basis of those phenotypic characteristics, such as dark skin, that drive 
this ascriptive incongruity, such that (3) census surveys that rely on self-
identification will not identify the observer-contingent racial ascription that 
may lead to their being the victims of discrimination.36
Matters are worse than that, for there is also reason to believe that 
observers’ implicit and culturally generated theories of race may bias the 
observations of other variables in an empirical research project after the 
observer generates a racial ascription.  Racial stereotypes have been shown 
to influence interpretive behavior such as the evaluation of evidence in a 
courtroom.
 
37
In one respect, the problem of theory-ladenness in the study of race is 
worse than that in the natural sciences, for in the latter, there are explicit, 
shared theories that structure observation.  In the empirical study of race, 
the theories of race that make a difference tend to be implicit and may differ 
depending on the individual involved.  This is likely to make it much harder 
for consumers and producers of research to take them into account. 
  This is yet another reason to worry about the hypothetical 
“aggression experiment” in the example I gave earlier:  our researcher is not 
only more likely to ascribe blackness to those who behave aggressively but 
also more likely to interpret the behavior of those whom he or she has 
identified as black as aggressive. 
In addition to creating systemic bias (a general tendency to come up with 
spurious results, e.g., in which black people are classified as hostile), this 
can create local bias rooted in the variability of observers.  Suppose two 
ethnographers are studying two communities that contain racial conflict.  
The extent to which each ethnographer interprets the actions of black 
 
of those photographed were always ascribed a race consistent with their own self-ascription); 
see also Mary E. Campbell & Lisa Troyer, The Implications of Racial Misclassification by 
Observers, 72 AM. SOC. REV. 750, 756–57 (2007) (finding high rate of incongruity between 
self- and other-ascribed races among self-ascribed Native Americans and, as I read their 
data, self-ascribed Latinos and multiracial ascriptions, although low rates of incongruity 
among other classifications). But see Simon Cheng & Brian Powell, Misclassification by 
Whom?  A Comment on Campbell and Troyer (2007), 76 AM. SOC. REV. 347, 352–54 (2011) 
(suggesting that previous result is an artifact of respondent-ascriptive inconsistency across 
multiple survey waves); see also Wendy D. Roth, Racial Mismatch:  The Divergence 
Between Form and Function in Data for Monitoring Racial Discrimination of Hispanics, 91 
SOC. SCI. Q. 1288, 1304–06 (2010) (describing a large amount of inconsistency between 
subjects’ free-form racial self-ascriptions and all of (1) the boxes they checked on the census 
form, (2) the racial ascription that the observed believed most others attached to them, and 
(3) the racial ascription initially applied to them by the researcher). 
 36. Roth, supra note 35, at 1290–91, 1299 (white self-identification by other-ascribed 
Latinos), 1300–02 (skin tone discrimination), 1307 (result that discrimination against Latinos 
is missed). 
 37. Galen V. Bodenhausen & Jennifer A. Richeson, Prejudice, Stereotyping and 
Discrimination, in ADVANCED SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY:  THE STATE OF THE SCIENCE 360 (Roy 
F. Baumeister & Eli J. Finkel eds., 2010). 
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members of that community as hostile or aggressive will depend not only 
on her shared cultural background theories of race but also on her own 
susceptibility to implicit stereotypes, including that stereotype which 
attributes hostility and violence to blacks.  An observer who is more 
susceptible may be more likely, all else being equal, to interpret the 
behavior of black people as hostile.38
Now consider that there are a multitude of observers in any empirical 
project.  There are, of course, the principal investigator and any coauthors, 
as well as research assistants who carry out the formal interpretation.  But 
there are also those who gather the data, such as survey-takers; those who 
select subjects based on observation of desired subject characteristics, such 
as lab assistants in experimental research; those who design sampling 
strategies in survey research; and those “coders” who ultimately reduce the 
observations into data sets that can be subjected to statistical analysis.  The 
biases introduced by each step of observation may distort the final result of 
an empirical study.
 
39
So far, the discussion in this Essay has been limited to the ways in which 
observers may distort both racial ascriptions and observations of other 
variables that may be linked to racial ascriptions.  But we have not yet put 
the observer and the observed into the same room.  Doing so introduces a 
variety of additional distortions into the research enterprise. 
  Even pre-observational steps may introduce bias, for 
example, through the theories of race held by the designers of experiments 
and survey instruments, which may not match those held by those who are 
to carry out the experiments or ask the questions. 
II.   OBSERVERS AND OTHER SUBJECT-DISTORTERS 
People behave differently when they are observed.  All lab experiments 
in the social sciences come with an implicit caveat with respect to external 
validity:  how people behave under the microscope of an experimenter need 
not be the same as how they behave in the external world.  Similar points 
apply to survey research, ethnographic research, and all other research in 
which the researcher and the act of observation are detectable by the 
subjects of research.40
 
 38. As standpoint theorists might suggest, racial observations are also potentially 
dependent on the racial categories to which observers themselves have been assigned, 
perhaps even independent of the theories of race which they hold.  For example, one study 
found that self-ascribed white and self-ascribed black interviewers perceived the skin colors 
of respondents differently. Mark E. Hill, Race of the Interviewer and Perception of Skin 
Color:  Evidence from the Multi-City Study of Urban Inequality, 67 AM. SOC. REV. 99 
(2002). 
  Indeed, survey-takers on particularly sensitive issues 
have developed a toolkit of techniques by which they attempt to ameliorate 
 39. Cf. Longino & Doell, supra note 21, at 220 (criticizing research into sex-linked 
behavior for unquestioningly relying on observations from subjects and parents/teachers of 
subjects). 
 40. See, e.g., Margaret D. LeCompte & Judith Preissle Goetz, Problems of Reliability 
and Validity in Ethnographic Research, 52 REV. EDUC. RES. 31, 37 (1982) (explaining that 
ethnographic research may be distorted “by the investigator’s social role within the research 
site”). 
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the effect of the inhibition respondents can be expected to experience when 
being asked by a stranger to talk about them.41
This partially explains the popularity of things like the measurement of 
implicit racial attitudes.  It is not just because people may not be aware of 
their own racial attitudes (though that is also true).  It is also because 
measuring explicit racism is quite hard, because people may not to be 
willing to admit it even when they are aware of it.
 
42
But the problem is not limited just to getting people to admit to socially 
unacceptable things.  Sometimes people also change or make up answers to 
please researchers.  In political science, for example, researchers have 
engaged in much tearing of hair and rending of clothing about the problem 
of “nonattitudes”—of survey respondents who utter a political belief just 
because some survey-taker asked them about it, without actually knowing 
or thinking anything about the topic—and sometimes respondents even can 
be induced to state opinions on totally fictitious subjects.
 
43
Versions of this problem already have been discovered in race research.  
Roth, after interviewing a number of people who self-identify as multiracial 
but checked a single race on a form replicating the U.S. Census 
questionnaire, reports that many expressed the belief that they were being 
asked to reduce their racial identity to a single dimension, and that the 
single dimensions expressed were the acceptable monoracial categories in 
the United States.
 
44  There is additional evidence consistent with the worry 
that in a study the self-ascribed race of the observed depends in part on the 
other-ascribed race of a specific observer, such as a survey-taker.45
There are also observer-observed interactions likely to occur as a result 
of the racial ascription that the observed applies to the observer.  The 
behavior that the observed are willing to exhibit may vary depending on 
 
 
 41. See generally Anton J. Nederhof, Methods of Coping with Social Desirability Bias:  
A Review, 15 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 263 (1985) (describing techniques used to ameliorate 
the effect of research subjects’ tendencies to tell survey-takers only things that reflect well 
on the subjects). 
 42. See Anthony G. Greenwald et al., Understanding and Using the Implicit Association 
Test:  III. Meta-Analysis of Predictive Validity, 97 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 17, 29–
30 (2009) (explaining that “social sensitivity” makes “self-report measures” of racism less 
reliable than implicit measures because of “impression management”—i.e., because people 
do not want to look racist, even when they are). 
 43. See Patrick Sturgis & Patten Smith, Fictitious Issues Revisited:  Political Interest, 
Knowledge, and the Generation of Nonattitudes, 58 POL. STUD. 66, 66–68 (2010) (reviewing 
literature). 
 44. Roth, supra note 35, at 1299–1300. 
 45. Aliya Saperstein & Andrew M. Penner, Beyond the Looking Glass:  Exploring 
Fluidity in Racial Self-Identification and Interviewer Classification, 57 SOC. PERSP. 1, 9–13 
(2014) (giving results of analysis of multi-wave survey data in which respondents sometimes 
appear to change their racial self-ascriptions to track other-ascriptions from survey-takers).  
Although Saperstein and Penner suggest that this is because the survey-takers were capturing 
the general perception of the community (and it is that community ascription that the 
respondents were following), it seems equally plausible that at least sometimes the survey-
takers signaled the race they ascribed to the respondents, and the respondents tracked that 
directly. 
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their perception of the observer’s race.46
There are also likely to be unconscious effects rooted in the social 
significance of race.  For example, one study provided evidence that (self-
ascribed) black respondents did better on a survey test of political 
knowledge when interviewed by (respondent-ascribed) blacks, consistent 
with the standard theory of stereotype threat according to which it is driven 
by fear of confirming pernicious stereotypes.
  For a trivial example, self-
identified whites may be less likely to make explicitly racist remarks in the 
presence of an experimenter whom they identify as black.  In turn, self-
ascribed blacks may be less willing to engage in behavior that they believe 
subject-ascribed white researchers will misinterpret, especially when race is 
salient. 
47  Importantly, there was no 
statistically significant difference in that study in correct answer rates 
conditional on the self-ascribed races of interviewers, just on the races the 
respondents ascribed to them.48
One of the most prominent manifestations of this problem is the oft-
discussed “race of interviewer effect” in survey research.  One study found 
that subjects of unknown-ascribed blackness were more deferential to 
interviewers of unknown-ascribed whiteness, and hence more willing to 
assert both internally inconsistent beliefs and beliefs consistent with a 
white-advantaging view of the world, a phenomenon which the researcher 
attributes to a fear of the political and social power of whites.
  This emphasizes the fact, stressed 
throughout this Essay, that changing the agent whose racial ascriptions 
count for purposes of scientific observation can change the results of a 
study (the researchers would not have seen any effect had they just relied on 
interviewers’ self-ascriptions), and underlines the urgency of identifying the 
source of all racial ascriptions in reported research. 
49  Similarly, 
there is evidence that (unknown-ascribed) whites express more “liberal or 
pro-black opinions” when faced with (unknown-ascribed) black 
interviewers.50  Another study, in the epidemiological context, has found 
that those solicited for study participation were more likely to participate 
when interviewed by a person of the same (unknown-ascribed) race.51
 
 46. In the survey literature, this is known as the “race of interviewer effect.” See 
generally Darren W. Davis, The Direction of Race of Interviewer Effects Among African-
Americans:  Donning the Black Mask, 41 AM. J. POL. SCI. 309 (1997) (observing change in 
behavior of unknown-ascribed black subjects to unknown-ascribed white interviewers 
relative to unknown-ascribed black interviewers). 
 
 47. See Darren W. Davis & Brian D. Silver, Stereotype Threat and Race of Interviewer 
Effects in a Survey on Political Knowledge, 47 AM. J. POL. SCI. 33, 34 (2003). 
 48. Id. at 40. 
 49. See Davis, supra note 46, at 312. 
 50. Shirley Hatchett & Howard Schuman, White Respondents and Race-of-Interviewer 
Effects, 39 PUB. OPINION Q. 523, 525 (1975). 
 51. Patricia G Moorman et al., Participation Rates in a Case-Control Study:  The Impact 
of Age, Race, and Race of Interviewer, 9 ANNALS EPIDEMIOLOGY 188, 191 (1999). 
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We also have good reason to worry that implicit attitudes might distort 
race research due to the interaction between observer and observed.52  For 
example, a researcher may unconsciously avoid interacting with a nonwhite 
subject relative to her interactions with a white subject,53 or to attend more 
to seemingly threatening black subjects than to seemingly nonthreatening 
black subjects.54
We can see the dynamics of racially distorted observation particularly 
vividly by looking under the surface of one particular study.  The study in 
question purported to provide evidence for a race of interviewer effect even 
in telephone surveys.
  This raises the danger that researcher-ascribed whites and 
researcher-ascribed blacks may be subject to different experimental 
treatments due to the effects of implicit attitudes on experimenter behavior. 
55
So what are we to do with this mess?  I cannot offer any definite 
prescriptions, but I can offer some opening thoughts. 
  Such a result seems puzzling:  How did the 
respondent managed to ascribe races to the interviewers without being able 
to see them?  We see our answer when we notice that the writers found a 
much stronger effect among (unknown-ascribed) white respondents than 
(unknown-ascribed) black respondents, and that both political scientists and 
participants were in Alabama in 1982.  It seems quite likely that both the 
ascribed-white respondents and the political scientists shared a common 
dominant-white-culture theory of race according to which races could be 
identified in part by verbal cues (read:  stereotypes).  Accordingly, subjects 
were able to “correctly” (from the researchers’ standpoints) identify the 
races of those who were interviewing them from their voices alone.  The 
theory-ladenness of racial observation shows up in a study that supports 
observer/observed effects on the contents of race-linked opinions. 
III.   METHODS FOR AND FROM CRITICAL RACE RESEARCH 
There are things that researchers can do to attempt to carry out race 
research responsibly, although none are without costs.  Perhaps the most 
obvious technique to ameliorate many of these problems is the brute force 
method:  statistical controls.  Suppose the principal investigator in any 
empirical project in which race is a variable of interest also administers a 
demographic questionnaire, plus whatever the current state of the art 
happens to be for measuring implicit stereotypes and attitudinal biases, to 
all research staff including herself, before carrying out the project. If 
psychologists could create such a thing, it also may be advisable to 
administer an instrument designed to measure the extent to which each 
member of the research staff subscribes to the various common beliefs 
 
 52. Sixty percent of members of all nonblack racial groups display an implicit 
preference for whites over blacks. Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, 
Implicit Bias:  Scientific Foundations, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 945, 958 (2006). 
 53. Bodenhausen & Richeson, supra note 37, at 363–64. 
 54. Jennifer A. Richeson & Sophie Trawalter, The Threat of Appearing Prejudiced and 
Race-Based Attentional Biases, 19 PSYCHOL. SCI. 98, 101 (2008). 
 55. Patrick R. Cotter et al., Race-of-Interviewer Effects in Telephone Interviews, 46 PUB. 
OPINION Q. 278 (1982). 
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about what makes someone a member of one race or another (e.g., descent, 
skin color, behavior).  Such a technique would at least make explicit some 
of the implicit theories of race present in the project, but also may allow 
them to be statistically reduced.  For example, the race and level of implicit 
bias of survey-takers can be matched to the respondents met by each 
survey-taker, and then included in a regression to control for the effect of 
such variables.  In effect, this technique would treat the biases of, and 
ascriptions applied to, participants in the research project as a garden-
variety problem of omitted variable bias. 
Unfortunately, not all observers can be varied.  We cannot control for the 
biases of a principal investigator, for example, except by replicating that 
investigator’s study with a different investigator, or maybe imperfectly 
through meta-analysis (which we might imagine as roughly approximating 
the random assignment of principal investigators to a question).  Moreover, 
the brute force technique carries with it the standard statistical problems 
attendant on proliferating variables, such as eating up degrees of freedom, 
and hence imposing more expensive demands on sample sizes. 
A third problem with the brute force method is that it requires identifying 
the race(s) of the observer(s).  But I have just spent an entire essay 
exploring the difficulties of racial observation, difficulties which this 
method would replicate.  Consider that an observer has potentially at least 
three relevant races:  a self-identified and generally externally identified 
race (or group of races), both of which may consciously or unconsciously 
affect her behavior toward and perception of the observed, and an observed-
attributed race, which may affect the behavior that the observed displays to 
her.  A properly constructed observer-investigation would require obtaining 
and controlling for all of this information. 
The observed-ascribed race would be particularly difficult to track, first 
because different subjects may ascribe different races to the same observer, 
and second because doing so is problematic as a survey or experimental 
question because of the extent to which making racial identification salient 
in the minds of subjects might distort their behavior in the actual study.56
This would not be so bad if it were possible to truly randomly assign 
observers to pools of survey respondents and experimental subjects, and 
that way suppose that any error attributable to such effects would be 
unbiased.  However, the pool of observers is biased toward more high-
status and whiter observers who are disproportionately represented on 
  
In experimental research, asking subjects about the race they ascribe to 
observers only after the treatment is applied and observations are made is 
no panacea, because those racial ascriptions may be affected by the 
experience of the experiment.  (Going back to the running “aggression 
study” hypothetical, experimenters instructed to show hostility toward 
subjects would be more likely to be identified after the fact as black.) 
 
 56. See, e.g., B. Keith Payne et al., Best Laid Plans:  Effects of Goals on Accessibility 
Bias and Cognitive Control in Race-Based Misperceptions of Weapons, 38 J. EXPERIMENTAL 
SOC. PSYCHOL. 384, 392–93 (2002) (asking experimental subjects to ignore race instead 
draws attention to race and increases race-based weapon perception bias). 
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university faculty.57
Perhaps the best ultimate response to this cluster of problems is 
awareness.  Even flawed science is better than no science.  Existing studies, 
which have been subject to all of these effects, have nonetheless given us 
important empirical traction on and theoretical insights into the social 
problems surrounding racial hierarchy.  By being aware of these effects, 
however, those on the science-consuming end of the intellectual enterprise 
can more appropriately determine the credence to be given to any individual 
study.  Researchers also can offer, recognize, and attempt to respond to 
critiques of any individual study on these lines, explaining, for example, 
why a study that purports to show some racial difference may lack external 
validity because of the distorting effect of observer properties, and 
attempting to replicate that study with different observers. 
  Accordingly, it is doubtful that even meta-analysis can 
sufficiently ameliorate the biased impact of these observer effects. 
Awareness, however, is no panacea.  Particularly, the effects of implicit 
bias appear to be resilient to conscious effects to avoid them; accordingly, 
we cannot guarantee that even the research of those within the critical race 
theory research program will be free from the consequences of, for 
example, pernicious observer-observed interaction biases resulting from 
implicit affective bias.  And scientific researchers outside the critical race 
theory project have shown a remarkable unawareness of the effects of the 
contingency of their own racial classifications even as they produce papers 
proving the existence of that contingency for other observers.58
Instead, awareness commands humility.  Cognizant of our inability to 
remove all these sources of bias from our empirical enterprise, we are 
forced to take seriously the provisional and contingent nature of social-
scientific knowledge claims.
  
Accordingly, we must not suppose that we can consciously suppress the 
observational sequelae of our hierarchical racial culture. 
59
 
 57. The National Center for Education Statistics reports, as of 2011, that those whom the 
Center classified as monoracial white occupied almost three quarters of the American 
postsecondary professoriate. Digest of Education Statistics, Table 315.20, NAT’L CENTER 
FOR EDUC. STATS., http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d13/tables/dt13_315.20.asp (last 
visited Apr. 23, 2015).  However, according to the American Sociological Association, 
trends in the granting of Ph.D. degrees in the social sciences do show an increasing 
percentage of scientists of color (as classified by the National Science Foundation). See 
Doctoral Recipients by Race/Ethnicity in Selected Disciplines, AM. SOC. ASS’N, 
http://www.asanet.org/research/stats/race_ethnicity/doctorate_recipients_80_90_00_06.cfm 
(last visited Apr. 23, 2015). 
  But that is not a result to be feared, because 
this also allows critical race philosophy of science to highlight the 
provisional and contingent nature of the social-scientific knowledge claims 
 58. See, e.g., Bartholow & Dickter, supra note 30, at 319, 323 (describing the racial 
classifications of some of their experimental subjects as “incorrect”—and even excluding 
them from their data—in the seeming assumption that they had some kind of privileged 
epistemic access to the true race reflected in the faces they displayed in their experiments, 
despite the evidence their own research suggested about the contingency of racial 
observation). 
 59. See LONGINO, supra note 9, at 207–08 (explaining that scientific knowledge, 
understood appropriately in accordance with the recognition of the social nature of scientific 
inquiry, is “partial,” “plural,” and “provisional”). 
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of others, and allows critical race scientists to develop alternative empirical 
conversations that highlight unexamined and ignored dimensions of the 
problem of racial hierarchy.  The role of critical race science in the larger 
landscape of science is in part to promote a broader conversation which 
allows voices of color (under the relevant ascriptions) to shed light on truths 
missed by white (also under the relevant ascriptions) voices.60
IV.   POSTSCRIPT:  A MANIFESTO FOR CRITICAL RACE SCIENCE 
 
When one proposes both to accept the epistemic claims of empirical 
science and to defend the use of research methods motivated by a political 
program, one is apt to be misunderstood.  Accordingly, I end this Essay 
with some claims about what science as an enterprise does and some other 
claims about what scientists who are motivated by critical race theory 
should do.  As a manifesto and a provocation, most of the claims below are 
not supported by evidence or by very much argument (the fifth is an 
important exception, for it answers a serious objection to the whole 
enterprise), but I hope they are appealing.  We are duty-bound to pursue 
both truth and justice and cannot believe that the two are incompatible with 
one another.  The six points that follow are my attempt to think about how 
our commitment to justice can inform our pursuit of truth, and vice versa. 
1.   Empirical science (including social science) 
does produce real knowledge. 
Nothing in this Essay is meant to deny objective truth nor the ability of 
science to get us closer to it (although never all the way).  Science, even 
social science, does produce knowledge, in that there are clearly better and 
worse claims to be made within its domain, based on the evidence it has 
produced—although, as Longino argues, this truth is “partial,” “plural,” and 
“provisional.”61
2.   If done uncautiously, empirical science can produce error, 
and that error is likely to advantage the already advantaged. 
  Scientific knowledge is conversation, not conclusion, but 
it is conversation that produces genuine progress over time. 
This Essay has given examples of the ways that uncautious empirical 
science can produce error with respect to race, as well as an account of the 
hierarchical status quo bias of scientific error. 
 
 60. See id. at 131–34 (arguing for “a diversity of perspectives” in discourse about 
scientific propositions); Anderson, supra note 19, § 5 (explaining idea of “bias as resource”: 
that science cannot be conducted without bias, so the aim ought to be the introduction of a 
healthy pluralism of biases to ensure that the research questions motivated by the interests of 
hierarchically subordinate groups are explored as well as those motivated by the interests of 
superordinate groups). 
 61. LONGINO, supra note 9, at 207–08. 
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3.   It is reasonable to think that many of the positive claims of critical race 
theory are true, and that science done right will be consistent with that. 
There is a wealth of evidence supporting the notion that, at least in 
American society, racial hierarchy is alive and well, and that those who are 
ascribed whiteness are advantaged by it relative to others.62
4.   Sound scientific method includes science done by scientists who have 
been ascribed socially subordinated races, and also includes science 
motivated by the normative program of critical race theory; the inclusion of 
these voices will bring science closer to truth. 
  Accordingly, it 
makes good sense from the perspective of a rational scientist to expect that 
future research will further support that notion, and to generate testable 
hypotheses in accordance with it. 
I have argued in this Essay that neutral science, at least when it pertains 
to race, is impossible, and that if race science necessarily begins from a 
non-neutral epistemic standpoint, then consciously incorporating critical 
standpoints will at least have the salutary effect of balancing out the biases, 
making it possible for evidence and interpretation that support those critical 
standpoints to make it into the scientific discourse as well as evidence and 
interpretation that support the status quo. 
5.   Sound scientific method always must retain the possibility of revealing 
to investigators that their prior positive beliefs were wrong. 
To defend the introduction of (additional) bias into the scientific process 
is not to reject the error-checking function of that process.  Critical race 
science, while it will investigate hypotheses designed to support the 
normative program of critical race theory, must nonetheless honestly 
investigate those hypotheses, and hold open the possibility of revealing our 
mistakes.  Otherwise, it ceases to be science and becomes propaganda. 
To be clear, science cannot directly tell us that our normative views about 
what constitutes racial justice are false, for those normative views are not 
subject to empirical scrutiny.63
This point answers the sharpest challenge to enterprises like critical race 
science.  That challenge was expressed at the symposium that led to this 
volume by my co-panelist Aya Gruber, who worried that critical race 
  But it can tell us that the facts (as best as 
we can see them) do not justify our evaluations of the world.  For example, 
suppose the best available evidence indicates that people who are ascribed 
the identity “black” are not subject to employment discrimination.  That 
cannot oblige us to change our view that employment discrimination is 
wrong, but it can oblige us to change our view that employment 
discrimination is happening. 
 
 62. See generally Gowder, supra note 26 (citing evidence for racial hierarchy). 
 63. This is a conventional philosophical claim about the impermissibility of inferring 
truth claims about morality from truth claims about the empirical world. See generally 
William K. Frankena, The Naturalistic Fallacy, 48 MIND 464, 466–67 (1939) (describing 
Humean view about facts and values). 
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science (as I conceive of it) is caught between the Scylla of endangering our 
commitments to justice and the Charybdis of “fiddling” so much with the 
science that it cannot give us reliable empirical traction on the world.  And 
while I have argued in this Essay that the science comes to us pre-fiddled, 
that is not a complete answer to Gruber’s objection, for critical race science 
might introduce biases that are more distorting to the truth-finding 
enterprise than the biases of existing science. 
This fifth manifesto item is directed at sketching the bounds of 
permissible fiddling.  The scientific enterprise in general ought to be 
capable of telling us when we are wrong:  we ought not demand that 
evidence against our views hurdle high epistemic barriers before we 
conclude that we are mistaken, and science ought to contain research 
projects which have the potential to generate that evidence.  Note that I 
speak of the scientific enterprise in general.  This is important.  Individual 
research studies do not need to be motivated by the goal of finding 
disconfirmatory evidence for our views.  Likewise, critical race science as a 
whole need not contain studies that are motivated by the goal of finding 
disconfirmatory evidence.  But science as a whole (critical race and 
otherwise) must carry out studies capable of finding such evidence, that 
evidence ought to be accessible to critical race theorists, and we ought to be 
open to believing it if we see it.  Furthermore, as honest searchers for truth, 
we ought to not discount that evidence, and we ought to seek out and draw 
attention to that among the work of others that undermines our beliefs as 
readily as we do the work that supports it.  The pursuit of social scientific 
knowledge is different from the briefing of a lawyer before a court. 
Thus understood, critical race science—empirical research motivated by 
the normative program of critical race theory—actually helps the research 
enterprise as a whole signal to consumers of empirical research their errors, 
including critical race theorists.  Return to the example of a moment ago.  
Suppose some researchers produce evidence suggesting that black folks are 
not the victims of employment discrimination.  In a world in which there is 
no critical race science, we might have strong reason to be skeptical of such 
a claim:  after all, we know that the scientific enterprise is biased.  But in a 
world with a vibrant critical race science, we would have less reason to 
reject such evidence, because we would have more reason to know that if 
countervailing evidence of employment discrimination were out there, it 
would have been found by the people who think like us and were looking 
for it.  Consequently, critical race science has the paradoxical power of 
actually making it easier for the scientific enterprise as a whole to convince 
us that we are wrong.  This is quite a neat trick:  critical race science can 
both help us prove to others that we are right when we are in fact right, and 
help others prove to us that we are wrong when we are in fact wrong.  It is 
an unequivocal boon to the struggle to bring belief and reality closer 
together. 
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6.   Scientific results are not only the products (in part) 
of social phenomena but also causal factors for them. 
What people believe affects what they do, and scientific results affect 
(one likes to think) what people believe. This raises the stakes for scientific 
research into race, for its conclusions may directly affect the phenomena 
under study. The diagram below reflects the relationships of influence 
between social facts about race and scientific conclusions about it. 
For example, psychologists have argued that one of the ways in which 
intergroup contact reduces bias is that it encourages people to see the 
groups in question as less distinct than they had previously thought.64
Of course, researchers ought not to tamper with their results in order to 
achieve such salutary ends; in addition to being unethical, such practices 
would also be self-defeating, in view of the likelihood that they would 
undermine the credibility of the research enterprise as a whole.  But this 
does suggest that if there are true facts for critical race social scientists to 
find, which also, if widely believed, would contribute to racial justice, then 
the enterprise ought to be preferentially set up to find them.
  If 
this mechanism can be generalized (and there is no obvious reason to think 
it cannot), then research that convinces people that there is less difference 
between people assigned to different racial categories can lead to less 
racially unjust behavior; to the extent those categories are in fact 
constructed in part out of hierarchical social facts, that may also undermine 
the stability of racial categories themselves. 
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 64. Natalie R. Hall et al., Reducing Implicit Prejudice by Blurring Intergroup 
Boundaries, 31 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 244, 244 (2009). 
 
 65. Here an analogy may be drawn to the notion of statistical power.  A scientific study 
may be flawed not just because it is likely to detect effects that are not there (type I errors), 
but also because it has insufficient “power” to detect effects that are there, and thus is subject 
to false negatives (type II errors).  I assert that social scientific research on race ought to take 
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7.   Critical race science is critical of something (injustice), and it is not 
designed for a world in which there is nothing to be critical of. 
A critical view of any kind presupposes a world of which it is critical, 
which tends to incorporate the opposite of the thing the critical view 
proposes.  Thus, critical race science is appropriate for a world in which 
there is racial injustice, and in which existing scientific practices are shaped 
by and support that injustice.  In such a world, normal science has more 
than enough resources to reveal when we who are committed to racial 
justice are making mistakes (so long as we are listening) but not enough 
resources to reveal when those who are not so committed are making 
mistakes—that is the bias for which critical race science partially 
compensates.  Accordingly, critical race science may not be an appropriate 
enterprise for a racially just world that naturally produces racially just 
science.  Let us hope one day to reach such a world in which critical race 
theory, scientific and otherwise, has helped make itself obsolete. 
 
particular care to avoid type II errors with respect to hypotheses which, if true and believed, 
can advance the cause of justice. 
